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The size and quality of this two-volume special issue in honor of Salvador Barberà
speaks to the wide scope of his contributions as a friend, co-author, mentor, and builder.
We begin by framing some of Salvador’s important research contributions.
The theory of social choice is at the very center of economic analysis. In the
late 1960s, following various contributions by William Vickrey, Robin Farquharson,
Edward Clarke, Ted Groves, Alan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite, the notion of strat-
egy-proofness took form and, together with ideas emerging in game theory, produced
an “economics of incentives”. This line of research became among the most fruitful
work in all of social science of the last quarter of the twentieth century. Salvador
Barberà is among the most influential scholars in this line of research, particularly on
the voting models side. He stands among the world leaders.
In particular, Salvador Barberà’s work on strategy-proofness has been of funda-
mental importance and he has made several seminal contributions. These begin with
papers that follow from his Ph.D. thesis and are particularly concerned with strategy-
proofness when one allows some randomization in outcomes. Those papers helped
uncover the role of chance or randomization in social decisions, and showed the lim-
ited extent to which that can help in mitigating individual incentives for manipulation.
That work has recently sparked a series of interesting follow-up papers. Salvador’s
other important works on strategy-proofness in such rich domains include insightful
proofs based on pivotal voter arguments and extensions to infinite settings (in work
with Bezalel Peleg).
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Many of Salvador’s most important contributions on strategy-proofness come from
analyzing a series of settings with restricted domains of preferences in which non-triv-
ial and interesting methods of choosing allocations are possible. One example along
these lines is the characterization of the voting rules that are non-manipulable when
some set of voters is electing a group of people to join a club or society. There, Salvador,
and his co-authors Hugo Sonnenschein and Lin Zhou, showed that certain quota-based
voting methods, where a candidate is elected if a given number of votes are cast in the
candidates favor, are the only anonymous voting systems that are strongly immune to
individual manipulations. These systems, and some natural generalizations of them,
are quite robust voting rules that appear in many practical settings, and this research
provides general insights into settings that admit nontrivial strategy-proof rules.
Salvador’s further investigations of nontrivial strategy-proof voting and allocations
appear in a series of papers with various co-authors including Faruk Gul, Ennio Stac-
chetti, Matthew Jackson, Jordi Masso, Alejandro Neme, and Shige Serizawa. Several
of those papers advance our understanding of the conditions under which a group of
voters can make decisions on several different dimensions or issues simultaneously
without being manipulable by self-interested individuals. Salvador has also provided
some definitive answers to some of the questions concerning the design of strategy-
proof markets and systems of exchange in a paper with Matthew Jackson. He continues
to derive new insights on the subject, and, for example, his recent work with Dolors
Berga and Bernado Moreno has led to a much deeper and fundamental characterization
of the preference domains that admit non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice
functions.
His work is widely known and cited and has been profoundly influential in framing
much research on the design of voting systems and institutions more generally, and
strategy-proofness in particular. It would be difficult for anyone working on this subject
not to cite at least one of Salvador’s articles. He is currently writing a book on strat-
egy-proofness, which should become the classic reference on this important subject.
His curiosity has also led Salvador to make important contributions on a wide array
of questions in economic theory ranging from rationalizing individual decisions (in
work with Birgit Grodal and with Prasanta Pattanaik), to how societies choose their
constitutions (in work with Matthew Jackson), locate public facilities (in work with
Carmen Bevia), and elect members who themselves become future voters (in work
with Michael Maschler, Jonathan Shalev, and Andres Perea) or select from slates of
candidates (in work with Danilo Coelho), as well as how societies should evaluate
profiles of utility (in work with Bhaskar Dutta and Matthew Jackson). These works
share a common thread of a careful theoretical analysis of individual and collective
decision making, but are wide-ranging in their applications and insights.
These are a few highlights of a very distinguished research career, and Salvador
continues to produce research of the highest quality. His substantial contributions in
this regard have earned Salvador a number of high honors including his recent Pascual
Madoz Prize, one of Spain’s highest honors for a social scientist, as well as his Rey
Juan Carlos Prize, the highest recognition for a Spanish economist, and his election
as a Fellow of the Econometric Society.
Any description of Salvador’s contributions to the profession would be very incom-
plete without noting that Salvador has also devoted much of his energies to building
123
SERIEs (2011) 2:423–430 425
research communities and institutions within Spain, and bridges from them to the
broader international research community. His list of accomplishments in this regard
is most impressive. Let us list just a few prominent examples.
Salvador was among an important wave of Spanish economic researchers who in
the late 1970s faced institutions that were arcane and whose funding was by inter-
national standards nonexistent. They had a mission to build modern economics in
Spain and they have succeeded beyond what anyone might have imagined. Spain, and
in particular Barcelona, is now one of the very strongest centers for economics in
continental Europe. Salvador’s efforts began with his return to Spain after finishing
his PhD, where he first spent 2 years in Madrid and then almost a decade in Bilbao.
During that time, Salvador was one of the founders of ASSET, which helped foster
serious and regular interaction among economic researchers in southern Europe. His
efforts at building research communities continued to gather steam as he moved to
the Autonoma in the late 1980s. There, Salvador played a central role in transforming
the economics department into a world-class and vibrant research department. The
foundation for economic research at the Autonoma had been already set in place with
the creation of the IAE, and was energized by the return of Salvador. Salvador’s efforts
were pivotal in hiring many of the excellent researchers that form its backbone today,
as well as raising its visibility internationally. In particular, Salvador successfully bid
for and hosted the 1990 World Congress of the Econometric Society. This is perhaps
the premiere meeting of economists, and is only held once every 5 years and attracts
thousands of economists. It is easy to underestimate how much time and energy run-
ning such an enterprise took. The meeting was well-received and helped consolidate
the Spanish community’s standing in the international research arena. Salvador’s tra-
jectory has included many other such endeavors. He helped found the research center
“CODE” in 1995. CODE is a research center that provides critical funding and stabil-
ity to researchers in the economics department at the UAB (Universitat Autonoma de
Barcelona). After CODE was on solid footing, in 2000, Salvador began serving as the
first director of “ICREA,” a very influential research organization that funds research-
ers in Catalonia. ICREA has been instrumental in encouraging researchers to return
from abroad in all sorts of disciplines. In the last 5 years, Salvador has been a key
partner in forging the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, which helps the var-
ious economics programs in the Barcelona region become more than the sum of their
parts, both in terms of educational mission and the interaction between the researchers.
Salvador’s latest brainchild, “MOVE,” is now taking shape and is an institution that is
helping to attract and retain key researchers in Barcelona, as well as sponsoring a wide
range of meetings on critical topics, and bringing through world-class researchers as
visitors. Of course, this list of Salvador’s many important contributions in building
research institutions and communities would not be complete without including Sal-
vador serving as the General Secretary of Research and Technological Policies in the
Spanish Ministry of Education and Science from 2004 to 2006! This clearly demon-
strated Salvador’s dedication to fostering and advancing research throughout Spain.
In recent years, Salvador Barberà’s reach in the support of science has broadened.
While the list above provides insight into Salvador’s substantial role in fostering
research and improving life within Spain, he has also been an active leader of the inter-
national research community. As a glimpse of this, Salvador has held the presidencies
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of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare and the Southern European Economic
Association, and has served on a spectrum of editorial boards, from Social Choice and
Welfare to Games and Economic Behavior, and has also served as a council member
of the Econometric Society and of several of its key committees, as well as being a
founding member of both the Society for Social Choice and Welfare and the Game
Theory Society.
In celebration of Salvador’s many contributions, we are very happy to present him
with this special issue on behalf of his many grateful friends and colleagues.
The many papers in this special issue cluster around various themes that have been
central to Salvador’s research.
First and foremost, there are a number of papers relating to strategy-proofness,
including those by Fuad Aleskerov, Daniel Karabekyan, M. Remzi Sanver and Vy-
acheslav Yakuba; Lars Elhers; Carmen Herrero and Ricardo Martínez; Michel Le
Breton; Hans Peters, Souvik Roy and Ton Storcken; Regis Renault and Alain Tran-
noy; Arunava Sen; and John Weymark.
There are also a number of papers on social choice and political economy more gen-
erally, including those by Pablo Amorós, Ricardo Martínez, Bernardo Moreno and M.
Socorro Puy; Alaitz Artabe, Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano; Gustavo Berg-
antiños, Jordi Massó and Alejandro Neme; Antonio Cabrales and Roberto Serrano;
Josep M. Colomer and Humberto Llavador; Gabrielle Demange; M. C. Gallastegui,
M. González-Eguino and I. Galarraga; Antonio Nicolo, Andrés Perea y Monsuwe and
Paolo Roberti; Bezalel Peleg, Peter Sudhölter and José M. Zarzuelo; Clara Ponsati
and Santiago Sanchez-Pages; John E. Roemer; and Joaquim Silvestre.
Finally, Salvador’s works on decision making are well represented by contributions
from Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Miguel A. Ballester and Jorge Nieto; José C. R. Alcantud
and Ritxar Arlegi; Walter Bossert and Kotaro Suzumura; Jacques Dreze; and Juan
Urrutia Elejalde; and his dedication to research and science is nicely represented by a
contribution by Javier Ruiz-Castillo.
In closing, we would like to thank the anonymous referees who responded to this in
record time and helped make these issues a success. Also, we are extremely grateful to
Victor Aguirregabiria and M. Angeles de Frutos who did heroic editorial work behind
the scenes to make this all run smoothly and to keep our burden light.
Selected works of Salvador Barberà in reverse chronological order
Preference for Flexibility and the Opportunities of Choice (joint with B. Grodal), J
Math Econ, forthcoming.
Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide? (joint with D.
Berga and B. Moreno), J Econ Theory 145(5), 1648–1674, 2010.
On the Rule of k Names (joint with D. Coelho), Games Econ Behav 70(1), 44–61,
2010.
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On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union
(joint with M. O. Jackson), J Political Econ 114(2), 317–339, 2006.
Locating Public Facilities by Majority: Stability, Consistency and Group Formation
(joint with C. Beviá), Games Econ Behavior 56(1), 185–200, 2006.
Voting by Committees under Constraints (joint with J. Massó and A. Neme), J Econ
Theory 122, 185–205, 2005.
Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions (joint with
M. O. Jackson), Quart J Econ 119(3), 1011–1048, 2004.
On Coalition Formation: Durable Coalition Structures (joint with A. Gerber), Math
Soc Sci 45, 185–203, 2003.
Supporting Others and the Evolution of Influence (joint with A. Perea), J Econ Dyn
Control 26(12), 2051–2092, 2002.
Self-selection Consistent Functions (joint with C. Beviá), J Econ Theory 105(2),
263–277, 2002.
Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences (joint with B. Dutta and A. Sen), J
Econ Theory 101, 374–394, 2001.
Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution (joint with M. Maschler and J.
Shalev), Games Econ Behav 37(1), 40–78, 2001.
Maximal Domains of Preferences Preserving Strategy-Proofness for Generalized
Median Voters Schemes (joint with J. Massó and A. Neme), Soc Choice Welf 16(2),
321–336, 1999.
Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges (joint with J. Massó and S. Serizawa),
Games Econ Behav 25(2), 272–291, 1998.
Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Expected Utility Maximizers (joint with A.
Bogomolnaia and H. van der Stel), Math Soc Sci 35(2), 89–103, 1998.
Voting under Constraints (joint with J. Massó and A. Neme), J Econ mic Theory
76(2), 298–321, 1997.
Strategy-proof Allotment Rules (joint with M. O. Jackson and A. Neme), Games
Econ Behav 18(1), 1–21, 1997.
Strategy-proof Exchange (joint with M. O. Jackson), Econometrica 63(1), 51–87,
1995.
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A Characterization of Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with
Pure Public Goods (joint with M. O. Jackson), Soc Choice Welf 11(3), 241–252,
1994.
Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees (joint with F. Gul and E. Stac-
chetti), J Econ Theory 61(2), 262–289, 1993.
Voting by Committees (joint with H. Sonnenschein and L. Zhou), Econometrica
59(3), 595–609, 1991.
Strategy-proof Voting Schemes with Continuous Preferences (joint with B. Peleg),
Soc Choice Welf 7(1), 31–38, 1990.
Maximin, Leximin and the Protective Criterion:characterizations and comparisons
(joint with M. O. Jackson), J Econ Theory 46(1), 34–44, 1988.
Falmagne and the Rationalizability of Stochastic Choices in Terms of Random
Orderings (joint with P. K. Pattanaik), Econometrica 54(3), 707–715, 1986.
Collective Probabilistic Judgements (joint with F. Valenciano), Econometrica 51(4),
1033–1046, 1983.
Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
Theorem. Int Econ Rev 24(2), 413–417, 1983.
Implementability via Protective Equilibria (joint with B. Dutta), J Math Econ 10(1),
49–65, 1982.
Pivotal Voters: A New Proof of Arrow’s Theorem. Econ Lett 6(1), 13–16, 1980.
Stable Voting Schemes, J Econ Theory 23(2), 267–274, 1980.
A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes, Econometrica 47(3), 637–640,
1979.
Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework. Rev Econ Stud 46(2),
379–389, 1979.
Preference Aggregation with Randomized Social Orderings (joint with H. Son-
nenschein), J Econ Theory 18(2), 244–254, 1978.
The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that do not leave too much to
chance, Econometrica 45(7), 1573–1588, 1977.
Manipulation of Social Decision Functions, J Econ Theory 15(2), 266–278, 1977.
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Papers in the volume
On Strategy-Proofness (alphabetically, by last name of first author)
• An individual manipulability of positional voting rules, by Fuad Aleskerov, Daniel
Karabekyan, M. Remzi Sanver and Vyacheslav Yakuba.
• A characterization of the uniform rule without Pareto-optimality, by Lars Ehlers.
• Allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked, by
Carmen Herrero and Ricardo Martínez.
• Euclidean Preferences, Option Sets and Strategy-proofness, by Michel LeBreton.
• Strategy-proof voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of
voters with elliptic preferences, by Hans Peters, Souvik Roy and Ton Storcken.
• Assessing the Extent of Strategic Manipulation: the Average Vote Example, by
Regis Renault and Alain Trannoy.
• The Gibbard random dictatorship theorem: a generalization and a new proof, byAru-
nava Sen.
• A unified approach to strategy-proofness for single-peaked preferences, by John A.
Weymark.
On Social Choice and Political Economy (alphabetically, by last name of first author)
• Deciding whether a law is constitutional, interpretable, or unconstitutional, Pablo
Amorós, Ricardo Martínez, Bernardo Moreno and M. Socorro Puy.
• Preferences, actions and voting rules, by Alaitz Artabe, Annick Laruelle and Fede-
rico Valenciano.
• The division problem with maximal capacity constraints, by Gustavo Bergantiños,
Jordi Massó and Alejandro Neme.
• Stochastically stable implementation, by Antonio Cabrales and Roberto Serrano.
• An agenda-setting model of electoral competition, by Josep M. Colomer and Hum-
berto Llavador.
• Majority relation and median representative ordering, by Gabrielle Demange.
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• Cost effectiveness of a combination of instruments for global warming: a quantita-
tive approach for Spain, by M. C. Gallastegui, M. González-Eguino and I. Galarraga.
• Equal Opportunity Equivalence in Land Division, by Antonio Nicolo, Andrés Perea
y Monsuwe and Paolo Roberti.
• On the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives: the case of two-person
NTU games, by Bezalel Peleg, Peter Sudhölter and José M. Zarzuelo
• Optimism and commitment: An elementary theory of bargaining and war, by Clara
Ponsati and Santiago Sanchez-Pages.
• The political economy of income taxation under asymmetric information: the two-
type case, by John E. Roemer.
• All but one free ride when wealth effects are small, by Joaquim Silvestre.
On Decision-Making (alphabetically, by last name of first author)
• Freedom of choice: John Stuart Mill and the tree of life, by Jorge Alcalde-Unzu,
Miguel A. Ballester and Jorge Nieto.
• An axiomatic analysis of ranking sets under simple categorization, by José C. R.
Alcantud and Ritxar Arlegi.
• Revealed preference and choice under uncertainty, Walter Bossert and Kotaro Su-
zumura.
• Nested identification of subjective probabilities, by Jacques H. Dreze.
• Anarchism, postmodernism and realism under confirmatory bias, by Juan Urrutia
Elejalde.
On the Economics of Science and Research
• The Evaluation of Citation Distributions, by Javier Ruiz-Castillo.
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